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NOTE AND COMMENT

NrBuLous INJu.,qcToNs.-Injunctive relief is sought against alleged
wrongdoing which is merely incidental to the conduct of a legitimate business. The wrong is established and the court is satisfied that an injunction
should issue. Yet some nice questions remain as to the scope and terms of
the decree.
The restraint should not go farther than is necessary to protect the complainant's rights. The business should not be needlessly destroyed or embarassed. If the defendant has asserted that it is impossible to conduct the
business without the incidents complained of, (as he is likely to do in
nuisance cases, with a view to securing a holding that there is no nuisance
or that, though there be a legal nuisance, the balance of convenience forbids
an injunction) strict logic might require that this be taken as a conclusive
admission when it comes to settling the terms of the decree. In view, however, of the fact that "impossibility" is, in these cases, relative, and in view
of the public interest involved, it is good sense, if not good logic, to give
the defendant an opportunity to do what he has asserted is impossible, if
there appears to be the slightest chance of success, and such seems to be the
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practice. Chamberlain v. Douglas, 24 N. Y. App. Div. 582; Anderson v.
American Smelting Co., 265 Fed. 928.
At the same time, it will not do merely to enjoin the defendant from
eonducting his business as he has in the past, for he could fulfill this decree
by varying some detail which would not at all remove the objectionable features. The court must, if possible, reach all wrongful practices of the sort
complained of, must throw the defendant back within the lines of his legal
privileges.
In cases where the circumstances are such that the rights of the parties
can be defined in exact terms, this principle is easy to apply. Thus where
defendant, who had no right to flow plaintiff's land, erected a dam which
flowed the land to a depth of x5 inches, the decree ordered defendant to
lower the dam fifteen inches. .Rothery v. N. Y. Rubber Co., go N. Y. 3o.
But in cases of nuisance and of unfair competition, it constantly happens
that, although the court is convinced that defendant has gone beyond his
privileges and has invaded the complainant's rights, it is impossible to define
these rights and privileges in terms that are at all definite. In this situation,
it has been a common practice to pass the difficulty to the defendant by a
decree which is little more than an order to cease committing nuisances, or
to cease unfair competition. In Winchell v. Waukeshaw, no Wis. ior, the
decree restrained discharge of sewage into a river "unless same shall have
first been so deodorized and purified as not to contain foul, offensive or
noxious matter capable of injuring plaintiff or her property or causing a
nuisance thereto." In Northuood v. Baeber Asphalt Co., 126 Mich. 28
the defendant was punished for violation-of a decree enjoining the emission
of fumes "in such quantities as to materially injure the health of plaintiffs or
in any way interfere with the comfortable. enjoyment of their homes." In
Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, the decree of the lower court restrained the operation of power hammers, etc., "so is to render the premises
of the plaintiff unfit for use and enjoyment as a residence by a reasonable
and normal pers6n." The fault in these decrees is obvious. . As was said in
the last case, in modifying the decree, "The entry of an.injunction is in some
respects analogous to the publication of a penal statute; it is notice that
certain things must be done or not done, under a penalty to be fixed by the
court. Such a decree should be as definite, clear and precise in its terms as
possible, so that there may be no reason or excuse for misunderstanding or
disobeying it; and when practicable it should plainly indicate to the defendant
all of the acts which he is restrained from doing, without calling upon him
for inferences or conclusions about which persons may well differ." See
also, Ballantine v. Webb, 84 Mich. 38.
In Laurie v. Laurie, 9 Paige 234, the Chancellor denied a motion for
attachment for violation of a somewhat similar injunction, saying, "As defendant is bound to obey the process of the court at his peril, the language of
the injunction should be so clear and explicit that an unlearned man can
understand its meaning without the necessity of employing counsel to advise
him." This is perhaps an unattainable standard, but a wholesome one to
aim at. Of course it is not likely that any court would impose any serious
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punishment upon a party who attempted in good faith to observe a decree,
although it found that he had done so. Good faith is well recognized as a
circumstance mitigating contempt. 22 CYC. io26. See Northwest v. Barber
Asphalt Co,. supra. But no one would contend that this cures the ill. To
enter an obscure decree and invite the defendant to throw himself upon the
clemency of the court, is neither fair to the defendant nor to the complainant,
nor is it a dignified way to administer justice. We do, however, in the unfair
-trade cases, find some courts taking the extraordinary position that uncertainty in the decree is of positive merit. In Charles E. Hires Co. v. Con.s'umers Co., ioo Fed. 8og, 813, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
said, "(The court) is not called upon to decide whether a new label proposed
for adoption would infringe."
"This is especially so here, where the infringement was deliberate and
designed. In such case the court ought not to say how near the infringer
may lawfully approximate the label of the complainant, but should place the
burden upon the guilty party of deciding for himself how near he may with
safety drive to the edge of the precipice, and whether it be not better for him
to keep as far from it as possible." A decree was ordered enjoining defendant from using labels or bottles "calculated to deceive purchasers," etc. It
has been sought to support this view with the familiar maxim that equity
-will not aid a wrongdoer (Oneida Community v. Oneida Trap Co., 168 N. Y.
App. Div. 769), but this is inappropriate as applied to a defendatit who is not
seeking affirmative relief but merely asking that the decree against him be
-made certain. If this position has any justification, it lies in the circumstance
that in cases of this type the defendant has no "equity" to hew close to the
line, and if he does not insist upon hewing close will have no difficulty in
avoiding a contempt. Even in this type of cases, the practice is not uniform.
Coca Cola v. Gay Ola Co., 211 Fed. 942. And see Nms, UNFAM CoMPVMoq,
§ 367, ff. It would seem that, although the defendant may have no equity to
ask the court to aid to "drive to the edge of the precipice," it is sound and
convenient practice to give the defendant an opportunity to submit a proposed remedy which, if it is approved by complainant or is clearly within the
defendant's rights, should be approved (that is to say, excepted from the general terms of the decree). When we turn from 'this type of case to cases of
nuisance, incident to the prosecution of a legitimate business and difficult to
eliminate without heavy expense and even jeopardy to the business, probably
no one would question that the defendant has an "equity" to hew to the line,
and is well entitled if not to a decree clearly marking out that line, at least
to one which will not drive him "as far from it as possible."
How can the court best meet these demands? That depends very much
upon the circumstances of each case, and no general rule seems possible. It
may, however, be worth while to note some of the expedients which have
been used. In the unfair 'trade cases, the courts have frequently given the
defendant an opportunity to submit for its approval a scheme of reform, a
new label, a new package, a new name, a new method. Nims, UNVAM ComPmnoiN, S 367. If the defendant "drives to the edge of the precipice," the
-court may well say that it is not prepared, at that stage of the case, to decide
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the point, and that the defendant, if he wishes the stamp of approval, must
withdraw to clearer ground. Cases where the defendant has an equity to
hew to the line are not so easy to deal with. In some cases the best expedient
will be what we might call an experimental decree. In Collins v. Wayne Iron,
Works, supra, the court modified the decree so that it enjoined operations between certain hours of the night, or at any other time save behind closed
doors and windows, saying "At least such a measure of relief should be tried
first." In Babcock v. New Tersey Stockyard Co., 2o N. J.Eq. 296, there is a
very interesting decree with three branches, one of which was a prohibition
of the keeping of live hogs on the premises for more than three hours, reserving to the plaintiff the right to apply for a modification of the time,
"which is adopted merely on conjecture." In other cases, although a nuisance
is proved, it may be best to postpone relief till further information is gained
in regard to means of improvement. This was done in another branch
of the decree last mentioned, the point being referred to a commissioner,
with leave to either party to move for action upon his report. In other
cases it may be best to postpone relief while the defendant experiments
with remedial measures. This was done in Shelfer v. London Electric Co.,
[1895] 2 Ch. 388, and in Anderson v. American Smelting Co., supra. Of
course, if the balance of convenience runs the other way, it might be more
equitable to render immediately a decree which would be certain to give
relief, with leave to the defetidant to apply for a modification upon a showing
that there is another adequate and less onerous remedy. This was done in
Chamberlain v. Douglas, supra, and in Galbraith v. Oliver, 3 Pittsburgh 78.
These and probably other expedients are available. Equity boasts of the
flexibility of its remedies. And if this phase of injunctive relief is given
proper attention it would seem that we n.ght wholly eliminate those decrees
which give the defendant "no rule of conduct which the law had not before
prescribed" (Ballantine v. Webb, supra), yet rumble the thunder of attachE.N..D.
ment.
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